Ever since the 85N Miller tragedy in April 2009 I’ve become increasingly anxious about the regulatory regime governing helicopter operations in the North Sea.
This is due primarily to the process which occurs after any major helicopter incident.
What I hadn’t realised until about a year after the Miller tragedy was that, as the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) completes its final report, all “interested parties” are given sight of the findings and invited to comment.
When I say “interested parties” I should explain this includes the manufacturer, in this case Eurocopter; the regulator from the country of manufacture, in this case the French regulator BEA; the European regulator, European Aviation Safety Agency, (EASA); our national regulator, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA); the helicopter operating company; and even the oil company for which the helicopter company was working.
Perhaps naively, I hadn’t been aware of this process. I had always thought our national regulator the CAA would consider the investigation report and deliver its findings and recommendations, independently.
Not so, and when it came to the Miller tragedy it was EASA that took the lead on recommendations and the issuing of directives, and so on.
The same thing happened again just over five months ago when, on May 11, a Eurocopter Super Puma EC225 model had to ditch after the vertical gear shaft pumping oil to the main gear box failed.
EASA took the lead and recommended increased monitoring of the shaft.
This regulatory body issued a number of air worthiness directives just as it had done after Miller. This was supplemented by an early finding by Eurocopter, which had identified that the shaft which had failed was from a specific batch and the problem was a manufacturing issue.
All of the suspect shafts had been located and taken out of service, so along with the EASA directives we were clear to get back to normal operations and our substantial fleet of Eurocopter EC225’s returned to service within hours of the incident.
On Monday, October 22, we witnessed a carbon copy of the May 11 incident.
Despite the helicopter manufacturer’s assurances just five months earlier and the regulatory interventions, another 19 people found themselves in the sea. Thankfully, luck in the form of good weather conditions played a significant part again.
The manufacturer, as you might expect, was quick to claim that its aircraft were safe. EASA took a few days to issue its position, which was yet another airworthiness directive instructing that increased monitoring should take place.
For the EC225 shafts, the “improvement” was to check the gear shaft every three hours instead of four.
For anyone working in the offshore sector the EASA position sounded like a version of an “operational risk assessment” (ORA). The ORA is widely used offshore to allow operations to continue when the normal operating standards cannot be met.
However, before the EASA position had time to filter through to the workforce, the CAA stepped in and placed a restriction on the EC225s from operating in the North Sea. Clearly the CAA was not comfortable with the EASA position.
Thank goodness for the CAA I say and all strength to this authority going forward, as I’m personally convinced we need to take control of our sector.
How this will all be resolved though only time will tell, but for me the anxieties around regulating this safety-critical sector have only increased.
Jake Molloy worked offshore in his early life. Today, he is the long-time offshore specialist and regional organiser for the trade union RMT.