As BP gets to grips with the Macondo well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico that continues to generate such a furore in the US, both the politicians and the oilmen are beginning to look to the future.
Much has happened since the Deepwater Horizon was destroyed in May. Notably, the Minerals Management Service has been replaced by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulation and Enforcement.
The office of the president imposed, and has tried to maintain, its moratorium on deepwater drilling.
The Development Driller III and the Development Driller II have made steady progress with the relief wells that BP hopes will put paid to Macondo.
Senate committees are probing the regulatory regimes under which all vessels, including dynamically-positioned mobile drilling units operate.
However, despite attempts at explanations by Rear-Admiral Cook of the US Coastguard, there has been little interest in the activities, signatories or regulations of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).
So here’s the question – what now?
It could be time to look at the experience of other nations in the aftermath of major oil-industry disasters – possibly excluding the US where, over the years, many offshore drilling units have sunk, exploded or been subject to some other misfortune, often with loss of life, but which, maybe because there was no associated environmental disaster, did not catch the attention of the public or politicians.
For instance, the mat-supported jack-up, Ocean Express, sank in 1976 in the Gulf of Mexico with the loss of 13 lives, but who remembers it now apart from the families caught in the mess.
Chronologically, the first disaster to make an impact on the British regulators was the loss of the jack-up, Sea Gem, in 1965, which by 1971 led to the Minerals Workings (Offshore Installations) Act.
This act required a number of things, including the provision of an offshore installation manager (OIM) with a specific responsibility for stability, and a standby vessel.
Rig owners and the operators of the time fulfilled the requirements in the most rudimentary fashion, installing the OIM virtually as a clerk for the toolpusher, who became “the rig superintendent”, and the standby vessels appeared in the form of redundant big trawlers.
The next major disaster was the loss of the Alexander Kieland, which was a Pentagone rig. It suffered catastrophic structural failure and capsized and, as a result, 123 of the 212 people on board were lost. The Norwegians instituted a range of regulatory requirements which, it was hoped, would shield the workforce from further accidents, including a stability requirement which would result in a semi-submersible remaining afloat even after losing a leg.
In 1982, the Ocean Ranger sank off eastern Canada. The crew of 83 died, including those in a lifeboat that overturned. The Canadians conducted an exemplary inquiry that resulted in a range of regulatory requirements.
In 1988, in the UK sector, the Piper Alpha production platform caught fire and exploded with the loss of 165 of the 226 people on board. The inquiry, led by Lord Cullen, resulted in a root and branch change to the manner in which offshore safety was dealt with. The Minerals Workings Act was replaced, in 1995, by the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations. The administrators and assessors of the process also changed from the Department of Transport to the newly formed Health and Safety Executive (Offshore Safety Division).
Offshore installations in the North Sea, including mobile drilling units, ceased to be regulated in the traditional manner and became subject to “goal-setting legislation”. Owners of these units had to work out for themselves what the risk to their workforce might be from being out there, drilling holes in the seabed and searching for and recovering volatile, and, in some cases, poisonous substances. Having sorted that out, they had to put in place processes and equipment that would reduce the risk of major accidents.
The idea was that companies operating offshore installations would develop departments whose job it would be to keep everybody safe, initially by carrying out investigations and research and then by developing risk-assessment processes.
Where these processes had identified means of improving safety, either by changing equipment or providing additional guidance or training, it would be done. The whole activity was overseen by the HSE, whose inspectors had, in part, been recruited from the nuclear industry.
While one could say that the safety-case regime is still a work in progress, and although its intent has tended to be subverted by the industry’s preoccupation with occupational injuries (slips, trips and falls), it is likely that it has improved safety in the North Sea. One outcome of such changes is that, in 2002, the International Association of Drilling Contractors developed a European template, and this was followed, in 2004, by an international template. So the question to all offshore installation operators, whether mobile or fixed to the seabed in some way, is “Do you sincerely want your guys out there to be safe?”. And the answer, of course, will be “Yes”.
The next question will relate to whether they want the regulator, whatever it is called, to fix it for them, or whether they want to deal with it themselves.
In the US, there are now signs that the new regulator is going to do it all. If the government in that country is capable of deciding, with limited evidence (despite the Deepwater Horizon accident), that no deepwater drilling should be taking place, even though the deep water starts only a few miles off the beach, what else is it going to decide?
However, a safety-case regime remains worthy of consideration.
When the judge who presided over the Ocean Ranger inquiry was required to dot the i’s and cross the t’s of the report, he said: “The Ocean Ranger disaster could have been avoided by relatively minor modifications to the design of the rig and its systems, and it should, in any event, have been prevented by competent and informed action by those on board. It is the essence of good design to reduce the possibility of human error, and of good management to ensure that employees receive training adequate to their responsibilities.”
This, then, is the task. A well constructed safety case will tease out failings.
It will ensure that the safety-management system a company has in place covers all aspects of its operations, and will provide guidance for the development of effective emergency procedures and training so that the risks of working out there will be “as low as reasonably practical”.
It sounds like a constructive approach doesn’t it?
Vic Gibson is a master mariner and a director of Marex Marine Services of Aberdeen, which has developed about 100 safety cases for offshore units
Recommended for you
